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Introduction
India with 29 states and 6 union territories possesses a federal structure which specifies three characteristics for different tiers of governments: division of functional responsibilities, assignment of autonomous revenue sources and system of inter-governmental fiscal transfers (Bagchi, 2003) . Exclusive powers of central and state governments are specified in Union list and State list respectively. The subjects like defence, macroeconomic stability, money and banking, international trade etc. are assigned to the central government in union list. The functions entrusted to the state governments are those of maintaining public order, agriculture sector, public health and sanitation, water supply, and irrigation etc. The powers falling in common jurisdiction are specified under concurrent list and these include education, transportation and social insurance etc. (Rao and Singh, 2007; Bagchi, 2003) . Similar to the expenditure function of the governments, the revenue sources are also divided. Central government is assigned with taxes which have broad and mobile bases like tax on income and wealth from non-agriculture sources, corporation tax, custom duties etc. Taxes within jurisdiction of state governments include tax on income and wealth from agriculture sector, sales tax, certain excise duties etc. Apart from the taxation power of states, constitution made recommendations for additional revenue sources to states as well, which includes sharing the proceeds of centrally levied taxes and providing grants from Consolidated Fund of India.
These transfers help states to bridge the gap between expenditure and their own revenue. The idea behind these transfers is to achieve uniformity in public services and the tax rates all over the country along with avoiding tax evasion and the high cost of decentralized collection.
The distribution of tax assignments between centre and states ensures fiscal autonomy to states up to some extent and makes for an effective federal structure. It is based on the principle of separation which indicates that the tax assignments between centre and state governments are mutually exclusive (Rao and Singh, 2007) .Taxation, among all revenue sources 1 is an important tool to finance the expenditure responsibilities for state governments.
Large differences in the expenditure pattern at the sub-national level (Rao et. al.,1999; Bagchi, 2003) Alfirman (2003) suggest that unlike output frontier where specific inputs i.e. capital and labour determine the output, the tax frontier is not subjected to specific inputs. As underlying relationship of tax revenue and its input factors is not very clear, implication of several factors has been analysed on tax capacity. Guided by the literature, a comprehensive data set has been used which covers economic, social, demographic, governance, and political aspects of states. These variables will help to identify factors to increase tax collection of less performing states.
There are few Indian studies on the determinants of tax collection. The use of better panel data methodology while incorporating several aspects of state economies is missing so far in estimation of tax capacity. This study fills this gap by providing improved estimates of tax capacity and tax effort using SFA. Construction of tax frontier at sub-national level will enable us to identify states performing near tax frontier i.e. collecting taxes near their tax capacity, and states which are far below their tax capacity. Based on these estimates all states are ranked from low tax effort to high tax effort. Low tax effort signifies that a state has not utilized its tax capacity fully relative to other states and vice-versa.
We aim to answer the following questions:
What is the role of economic structure on the tax capacity?
( adverse effect on the tax efficiency whereas the effect of the latter is lesser than the former.
On the other hand, larger expenditure responsibility and better governance index of a state have favourable effect on the tax efficiency which has further improved with enactment of FRBMA. As far as political variables are concerned, the results show that effective number of parties which indicates the political competition inside a state has favourable effect on its tax efficiency.
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the brief overview of various revenue sources of the states such as: their own tax revenue, federal transfers, debt and FRBMA. Section 3 documents the literature review and methodological developments, where the methodology of SFA is explained. Section 4 gives the detail of all the variables. In section 5 the political economy of federal transfers is studied. Section 6 represents the computation of tax capacity and tax effort. Section 7 presents the concluding remarks.
Federal Structure in Indian Economy
In this section we give brief introduction about important features of Indian federal structure.
First, we give brief overview of share of each tax in total tax revenue, which is followed by contribution of federal transfers and debt. Also brief description of enactment of FRBMA is given. discretion. This was known as Gadgil formula, after the name of the then deputy chairman of PC (Ramalingom and Kurup, 1991 when it was recommended to review the finances of centre and state governments and to suggest ways to restructuring of public finances to restore the budgetary balance and macroeconomic stability (Rao and Sen, 2011) . In the implementation of FRBMA, a rule based fiscal framework, enacted in 2003 was another major reform. Computed by dividing the gross total transfers from centre to states by aggregate receipts of states. Source: RBI (2004 RBI ( , 2010 RBI ( , 2012 This Act, which required central government to take appropriate steps to reduce fiscal deficit The goal of making finances sustainable requires a combination of actions such as: reducing unproductive expenditure; increasing own tax collection etc. Hence it is important to test the effect of FRBMA.
Major Taxes
Debt
Another important component of revenue is borrowing that includes loans from the central government, loans from market and National Social Security Fund (NSSF) securities etc.
These components together make the internal debt of the States. Market loan is the major component of the total debt which has increased from 3.1% of total revenue in 1991-92 to 8.9% of total revenue in 2010-11.
Three sources described above, namely States' own tax revenue; transfers from the centre;
and borrowing constitute approximately 87% of the total revenue of the States. Rest of the revenue comes from interest receipts, profits, lotteries, dividends etc. Since these form a small proportion of the total revenue, they are not considered in this study.
Methodological Developments
Four approaches are widely used in the literature to estimate the tax capacity of a government: Income Approach; Representative Tax System (RTS) and Aggregate Regression Approach (Bahl, 1972; Rao, 1993; Paincastelli, 2001; and Purohit, 2006) . The fourth and the latest approach is stochastic frontier analysis.
Income Approach
In this approach, revenue capacity is calculated by taking state/national income as the tax base. Further tax effort is defined as the ratio of actual tax collection to the state/national income. This measure is considered inadequate as it assumes income to be the only factor determining the differences in the tax revenue, ignoring other potential tax bases. RTS method is transparent as each category of tax revenue is related with its respective tax bases. However, proxies of tax bases are used in practice because it is difficult to find accurate and reliable tax bases (Thimmaiah, 1979; and Rao, 1993) . In the absence of closely defined tax bases the estimates of tax capacity are arbitrary (Thimmaiah, 1979) . If the analysis has to be conducted at the sub-national level then the availability of the data on respective tax bases can be a complicated task.
Representative Tax System
Aggregate Regression Approach
The third widely used approach is the Aggregate Regression Approach, which incorporates a set of independent variables explaining variation in the inter-regional tax-revenue. Estimates of tax capacity are computed by relating aggregate tax revenue with macro parameters of the respective entity. These parameters could be GSDP of various sectors e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary etc. A set of demographical, social, geographical and political variables can also be included in the analysis to explain the variation in the tax-revenue. Majority of studies have applied this approach. Gupta (2007) in a multi-country dynamic panel model finds significant effect of structural variables like per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), share of agriculture sector in GDP, trade openness and foreign trade on the tax revenue of these countries. Davoodi and Grigorian (2007) included a measure of shadow economy and a measure of institutional quality as a proxy for quality of governance, rule of law and corruption. Mahdavi (2013) computed the tax effort indices for separate categories of taxes for American States using regression method.
Studies in Indian context have mainly applied regression approach. Oomen (1987) had regressed the aggregate tax-income ratio on the income of agricultural sector; manufacturing sector; and income from hotels, trade and commerce. The actual tax-income ratio has been divided by the estimated tax-income ratio to create an index of state tax effort. Thimmaiah (1979) has applied the multiple regression approach at the disaggregated level to estimate marginal revenue effort of south Indian States. The author has used tax base proxies and other structural variables as set of explanatory variables. Rao (1993) categorizes Indian States into three categories: high capacity States, middle capacity States and low capacity States using the modified RTS method. Modified RTS method here refers to the multiple regression analysis at disaggregated level of tax revenue using structural variables like level of urbanization, income disparities as potential explanatory variables along with the tax bases.
The major criticism of regression approach is that the residual error which can contain a random component is taken as the measure of tax effort (Rao, 1993) .
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA)
SFA is an extension of regression approach. Analogous to the production function, a stochastic tax frontier measures the maximum output i.e. maximum revenue a unit (a state in this study) can achieve given a set of inputs i.e. tax base and other determinants of tax revenue. The difference between the actual revenue and the maximum revenue indicates the technical inefficiency of that unit as well as policy issues (Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010 . The standard econometric stochastic frontier model is presented by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) . Several variants of this model have been applied in the literature with different structure of the inefficiency term and with different distributional assumptions. We apply the Battese and Coelli (1995) model where inefficiency term is assumed to be a linear function of a set of explanatory variables. The distribution of inefficiency term is assumed to be truncated normal. Stochastic frontier for panel data is defined as:
..... (1) Where Y it denotes the own tax revenue for i-th (i=1, 2,....,N) 
W it is a random variable, defined by the truncation of normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2 .
Since it explains the structure of technical inefficiency in terms of other variables, this model is well suited to our objectives. It simultaneously estimates the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency equation. The underlying estimation method is the maximum likelihood method.
Technical efficiency of i-th state at t-th time period is defined as Exp (-u it ).Given the specification of the model, we test the following hypotheses:
(i) Technical inefficiency term is not effected by explanatory variables, hence
(ii) Technical inefficiency term is not stochastic, hence H 0 : λ = 0, where , which is expressed as ratio of standard deviation of inefficiency term to the standard deviation of error term. It provides information on the relative contribution of both error components in total error term.
The construction of error term is the conceptual difference between the estimates of regression model and SFA model. In regression model the error term, which represents the inefficiency, can be positive or negative, indicating that a state can deviate from the average predicted revenue by under-performing or over-performing. In other words tax effort can exceed hundred percent also. On the other hand in SFA analysis the non-negative component of error term ensures that a unit can achieve optimal output at maximum i.e. the actual revenue cannot exceed the optimal revenue (Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010 and Cyan et. al. 2013 ).
The technique of stochastic frontier has been applied to estimate tax capacity in a few studies. Pessino & Fenochietto (2010& 2013 Only one study in literature (Jha et. al., 1999 ) combines two sets of literature i.e. effect of fiscal federalism on the estimated state tax efforts using SFA. Authors have not studied the potential implications of fiscal, political and governance factors on tax effort. The present study fills this gap. Our study is the improvement over Jha et. al. (1999) study in terms of incorporating comprehensive data set which includes structural, economic, fiscal, political and governance variables for the latest period of 1992-92 to 2010-11.
Data and Variables
Variables can be classified into two sets. First set includes variables to estimate the tax capacity whereas second set includes variables affecting inefficiency in total tax revenue.
Tax capacity variables are as follows:
1. Economic variables;
2. Indicators of infrastructure availability;
3. Structural and demographic variables.
Variable explaining the technical inefficiency are of4 types: Urban income inequality variable has been obtained from . Data for effective number of political parties (ENP) till the year 2005 has been taken from . For the rest of the years it has been calculated. The detailed list of data sources and variable construction has been given in the Appendix.
Dependent Variable
As the objective taken up in this study is to estimate tax capacity at the sub-national level with respect to their own tax revenue, hence states' own tax revenue as ratio of GSDP (at current prices) is the dependent variable, taken in logarithmic form.
Explanatory Variables for Estimating Tax Capacity
(i) Economic Factors
Variables considered in this category represent the level of economic development. Percapita GSDP is considered as the tax base for overall tax collection and as well as an indicator of development. This is commonly used to explain the tax potential of a unit and it is expected to have positive effect on the tax income of a state. Another important variable considered is the proportion of labor force in the total population. This variable has been calculated using the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) data for various years. Higher literacy is expected to raise awareness to pay taxes and lower evasion of taxes. Hence literacy level is expected to have positive sign with the tax collection. Similarly higher urban population is also expected to be positively related with tax collection as it indicates higher level of development and as well as larger industrial and service sector.
(iv) Structural Factors
Share of agriculture GSDP in total GSDP explains the structure of an economy. Bharagava (1999) highlighted that the importance of agricultural tax has declined from third five year plan onwards. This sector suffers from relative lack in buoyancy in tax revenue (Chatterjee, 1968) . India has high exemption base of agriculture income from taxation (Sengupta and Rao, 2012) and these exemption limits are not same across states (Bhargava, 1999) . Undertaxation of agriculture sector has led to the horizontal inequity in tax structure in favour of rich farmers (Krishna, 1972) . Due to all these rigidities we expect a negative relationship between size of agriculture sector and total tax collection of a state. will receive large transfers, might reduce its tax effort. Hence we expect inefficiency to increase with larger transfers from the centre. Several studies have reported negative impact of central transfers on states' tax collection (Jha et. al. 1999; Naganathan & Sivagnanam, 2000; Panda, 2009; and Dash & Raja, 2013) . These studies differ with respect to the methodology used to compute tax effort index for states.
Explanatory Variables for Inefficiency Equation
(ii) Total expenditure to GSDP (at current prices) ratio
Another variable is total expenditure to GSDP ratio as an indicator of the size of the government. It signifies the desired level of public goods and services to be provided by a state to its citizens. Ho and Huang (2009) explained the "Tax-and-Spend"; "Spend-and-Tax";
and "Fiscal-Synchronisation" hypothesis. The first hypothesis states that changes in government revenue influences changes in government spending. Governments frame their expenditure policy based on their tax revenue and try to balance their budget by increasing tax revenue. On the other hand the second hypothesis emphasises that desired level of tax revenue in a state is determined by their perception of desired level of expenditure. Hence larger the expenditure responsibility, larger should be the effort to collect taxes to finance these expenditure responsibilities. The third hypothesis suggests that both tax revenue and expenditure levels are determined simultaneously. Authors giving brief literature on the validity of these hypotheses, explain that the consensus has not been reached in favour of one hypothesis and literature has given the inconclusive results. Hence this suggests a bi-direction influence of tax revenue and expenditure responsibility of state governments, which can further cause a problem of endogeneity into our model. In order to avoid this problem the lag of total expenditure to GSDP ratio has been used. 6 Some of variables included in other studies to construct governance index are already used in our study as dependent or independent variables. For example, while states' own tax revenue is included in Mundle (2012) study, it is our dependent variable. Similarly Literacy and Road length are part of governance index in Mundle (2012) , these are independent variables in our study. Hence we have constructed a composite variable covering law and order aspect as proxy for governance, rather than using governance index from literature to avoid any overlap and correlation between independent variables. (Singh and Vashishtha, 2004; Biswas et. al., 2010) . With higher representation in the centre government, a state government might exhibit lower efficiency in tax collection in the hope of receiving more transfers.
The descriptive statistics of variables is reported in Table 3 . Data indicates the across state variation in all the variables considered in this study over the period of 1992-93 to 2010-11.
The total data points for ach variable are 266 except urban gini coefficient as data is not available for Haryana for all the years. 
Political Economy of Inter-governmental Transfers
Although the transfers by FC were designed to fulfil the goal of equity but some level of discretion is pursued in transfers (Khemani, 2003; Arulampalam et. al. 2008; Biswas et. al. 2010) . Plan grants in the form of State Plan Scheme (SPS) transferred by central government are based on a formula decided by National Development Council (NDC). Hence these grants are not considered as discretionary transfers in fiscal literature. On the other hand, grants in the form of CPS and CSS transfers are discretionary as these components are not distributed on the basis of any formula (Bagchi, 2003; Arulampalam et. al. 2008; Biswas et. al. 2010) .
Similarly central loans are transfers where government has some discretion. P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 Note: 1) P-value is given in the parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; 2) Time dummies have been taken in each of the model.
Computation of Tax Capacity and Tax Effort: Individual States
In this section tax capacity and tax effort is estimated for 14 major Non-Special category States over the period of 1992-93 to 2010-11.
The problem of endogeneity can arise due to following reasons. First, our independent variable inter-governmental transfer itself has been influenced by political environment (Table 4) . Second, mentioned in Section (2.2) revenue raising ability was one of the important criteria to determine federal transfers to each state. Hence there can be bidirectional causality. Third, as indicated by literature there can be bi-direction causality between tax revenue and total expenditure of states (Section 4.3).Fourth, outstanding liabilities can be affected by expenditure and tax revenue at the same time. Hence to avoid this problem of endogeneity first lag of fiscal variables (including total transfers net of loan) is taken.
The estimation results for parameters of own tax revenue of States using stochastic frontier approach are presented in Table (5) . Different specifications of the model have been applied to check the robustness of the results 8 . In all the models time dummies have been included.
All the models differ with respect to the variable inclusion in the inefficiency equation except third model where urban gini is added to investigate its effect in measurement of tax capacity.
First two models differ as governance index is included the second specification. In the fourth and fifth specification all variables other than urban gini are included. These two specifications differ as two variables outstanding liabilities and debt repayment are included interchangeably.
The magnitude of the parameters does not vary much across different specifications except for some variables. Also the sign and significance of parameters is more or less robust. Model 3 indicates that the urban income inequality leads to higher tax collection but its effect is insignificant. As the data for urban gini coefficient is not available for the whole period of study, the observations fall from 266 to 249. But sign of all other coefficients are robust to inclusion of this variable. While estimation of fifth model has been used to compute tax effort indices of the states over the years, the results of other three specifications have been reported to show the robustness of the outcomes.
Tax collection is positively and significantly related with per-capita GSDP suggesting that larger tax base as shown by higher per-capita GSDP leads to higher tax collection. One percentage change in per-capita GSDP leads to 2.01 percent change in tax-GSDP ratio (Model 5).The square term of this variable is negative and statistically significant in all five models. Hence at higher levels of per-capita GSDP the elasticity of tax-GSDP ratio declines suggesting that tax-GSDP ratio increases at decreasing rate. The coefficient of share of agriculture GSDP is negative and statistically significant in all the models as expected. This negative relationship suggests that large size of agriculture sector has negative impact on tax collection which could be due to exemptions and lower incomes in this sector. Literacy rate, a sign of development and awareness, has a positive and significant association with tax-GSDP ratio in the fifth model. It could be due to higher incomes or compliance among literate population. Hence literacy rate is an important variable to explain the taxation capacity of a state. The proportion of labor force displays a positive and significant association with tax-GSDP ratio in all the models. Larger labor force improves the tax base which further leads to higher tax collection. Same holds true for road density which represents infrastructure availability and has positive and significant association with tax-GSDP ratio.
Interpreting the Inefficiency Equation
9
It turns out that in all five models the lambda parameter is statistically significant, which indicates the presence of technical inefficiency. We estimate technical inefficiency after The governance index has negative and significant impact on inefficiency in tax collection. It implies that better governance in general reduces inefficiency in tax collection by States.
Econometric analysis also reveals that FRBMA Act, which is aimed to achieve fiscal discipline among states, has contributed to reduce their inefficiency in tax collection.
While observing the effect of political environment on tax inefficiency, only one variable, effective number of political parties (ENP), effects tax inefficiency with negative and significant sign. More competition among political parties may be making them more accountable and efficient, raising tax effort of the state government. Other variables do not have any significant effect on the inefficiency in tax collection, although we saw that other political variables affect transfers (with and without central loans) that in turn affect tax effort.
Tax Effort Index
The fifth model from Table ( 5) has been chosen to compute the tax effort. Table ( and Table (7) presents the comparison of tax efficiency score before and after the implementation of FRBMA. Note: 1) Computed using efficiency scores obtained from fifth model in Table 5 .
2) Red line shows the year of implementation of FRBMA. Apart from analysing various factors effecting tax inefficiency at sub-national level in Table   ( 5), we also study extent of disparity in tax efficiency among states over time. The presence of disparities in tax efficiency score reported in Figure ( 2) and Table ( 6) motivates to investigate whether the extent of disparity is declining over time. There exists disparity in tax effort across states and it is widening over time. Conditional benefits of DCRF and the debt write-off scheme attached with implementation of FRBMA improved the tax effort of states, but the absence of convergence suggests these effects have not been large enough. Therefore the elements of conditional transfers and debt write offs should be increased in future Finance Commission awards. Since more development, better infrastructure and governance improve tax effort, transfers can also be made conditional on expenditure in areas like health, education, sanitation, and infrastructure that contribute to development. This would also help the Finance Commission move back to its original constitutional mandate of providing uniform public services through the country. The imposition of planning soon after independence led to a dilution of this mandate (Goyal, 2013) .
Transfers have to be accompanied by discipline otherwise they motivate the weaker states to remain weak and underprovide the public services the transfers are made to finance. Such conditionality should also accompany other types of transfers, even as the share of discretionary transfers is reduced. This would also increase the share of formula based transfers such as the Finance Commissions award. Incentive mechanisms work best when isolated from political renegotiation. The Centre should absorb less of the risk of market borrowings by states, so market discipline also contributes. One of our results is larger expenditure responsibilities are followed by higher tax effort. To the extent conditional transfers maintain expenditure their effect on weakening expenditure and lowering tax effort would be reduced. More research is required on the extent to which states met FRBM targets by reducing expenditure, and how to ring fence productive expenditure.
Conditionality in transfers can reduce freedoms for states. At present tight restrictions on end use and delays in sanctions reduce the utility of the transfers for states. But conditionality and better local projects are consistent if transfers are made more time-bound and outcome rather than use based. The changes have to be gradual and in step with local capacity creation to deliver outcomes.
Strengthening of factors associated with better tax collection is a long term process.
Nevertheless a sharper identification of the variables that affect these factors, allows policies to better target these variables, so that improvements, such as in per-capita GSDP which is the overall tax base, take place faster. Notes: 1. Fiscal management is assessed as the difference between states' own total plan resources estimated at the time of finalizing Annual Plans and their actual performance, considering latest five years. 2. Under the criterion of the performance in respect of certain programmes of national priorities the approved formula covers four objectives, viz.: (i) population control; (ii) elimination of illiteracy; (iii) on-time completion of externally aided projects; and (iv) success in land reforms. Source: PC(2012). 
